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ABSTRACT 
 
On the basis of the XSS (Cross Site Scripting) and Web 
Crawler techniques it is possible to go through the 
barriers of the Google Adsense advertising system by 
obtaining the validated links of the ads published on a 
website. Such method involves obtaining the source 
code built for the Google java applet for publishing and 
handling ads and for the final link retrieval. Once the 
links of the ads have been obtained, you can use the user 
sessions visiting other websites to load such links, in the 
background, by a simple re-direction, through a hidden 
iframe, so that the IP addresses clicking are different in 
each case.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The correct encryption and coding of the ads published 
by third parties is a problem of paramount importance 
when it comes to ensure the confidence and reliability of 
the pay per click systems. With this method, the 
advertising company pays the websites publishing their 
advertisements, provided that the users click on them, in 
a proportionate and transparent manner depending on 
the number of visits and their validation. This system is 
used by Google Adsense, Google’s advertising service, 
which manages the suitable ads for each website and 
user profile. When it comes to studying Google’s 
advertising system the following questions arise .What’s 
the security level of the ads? Can you obtain links 
automatically? Is it possible to click automatically on 
the ads obtained? In the paper by (Mann, C.C. 2006) 
published in Wired magazine, they lend importance to 
the fact that there is a prevalence of mistrust due to click 
frauding in advertising systems such as Google 
AdSense. Specifically it is argued that there are robots 
capable to boost the number of clicks of an ad published 
on a website, fostering the profit of the advertising 
platform.    
To give an answer to those questions a security test was 
developed. Such test combined Cross Site Scripting 
(XSS) and Web Crawler techniques to overcome the 
system barriers to get the legitimate and validated links 
generated by Google Adsense during the user’s visit to 
the website. After a positive result, in October 2013 a 
first round of talks was held to warn Google about the 
security breach detected and to work together patching 
the loophole. In January 2014 Google neither had 
admitted nor denied the existence of such problem, thus 
to this day it has not been solved. In the present paper 
we want to draw the attention about this kind of 
vulnerabilities that may be resolved and ought to be 
taken into account because of the danger they entail. 
   
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Google Adsense vulnerability can be sequenced in two 
phases. 1) Obtaining the links of the original ads of a 
website automatically. 2) Execute automatic clicks on 
the ads obtained. 
 
1) Obtain the links of the original ads of a website 
automatically 
The vulnerability target is all the websites which contain 
Google Adsense text ads. In any case, the links of the 
ads are not visible by observing the website source code. 
However, it is possible to check the URL address of the 
link by analyzing the ad web element with a DOM 
browser. Thus, there are security mechanisms in Google 
AdSense which enable to build the HTML elements of 
the ads in DOM and java, once the website has been 
loaded in the client’s browser. It is for this reason that 
the links of the ads are not visible in the web source code 
despite being there. This security measure is designed as 
to prevent the links from being obtained automatically 
and it is deemed to be an unassailable technique 
(GANDHI, M.; JAKOBSSON, M.; RATKIEWICZ, J. 
2006, p.134). Unfortunately, it is possible to breach this 
barrier; you only have to obtain the target website source 
code and detect the Google AdSense code, see figure 1.  
<div id="GoogleAdSense"> 
<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> 
 google_ad_client = "pub-1229649499684927"; 
 google_ad_channel = "ANUNCIOS.COM" 
 google_ad_type = "text"; 
 google_max_num_ads = 3; 
 google_language = "es"; 
 google_safe  = "high"; 
 google_encoding = "utf8"; 
 google_ad_width = 336; 
 google_ad_height = 280; 
 google_ad_format = "336x280_as"; 
 google_color_border = "EEEEEE"; 
 google_color_bg = "EEEEEE"; 
 google_color_link = "000066"; 
 google_color_text = "000000"; 
 google_color_url = "CC0000"; 
</script> 
<div id="GoogleAd"> 
<span>Sponsored links </span> 
<script language="JavaScript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js" 
type="text/javascript"></script> 
</div> 
</div> 
Figure 1. Java code in Google AdSense 
The java file “show_ads.js” embeds the ads in the target 
website HTML code once it has been completely loaded 
in the browser. Nevertheless, they are not introduced 
directly, they use two window frames  <iframe> which 
we will call “Iframe 1” and “Iframe 2”, see figure 2. 
 
<!-- Iframe 1 --> 
<iframe width="0" height="0" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" vspace="0" hspace="0" 
allowtransparency="true" scrolling="no" allowfullscreen="true" style="display:none" id="google_esf" 
name="google_esf" 
src="http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/html/r20140904/r20140417/zrt_lookup.html"></iframe> 
 
<!-- Iframe 2 --> 
<iframe id="google_ads_frame1" name="google_ads_frame1" width="336" height="280" frameborder="0" 
src="http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/ads?client=ca-pub-
1229649499684927&amp;format=336x280_as&amp;output=html&amp;h=280&amp;adk=3476478377&amp;w=336&amp;lmt=1410
413197&amp;num_ads=3&amp;channel=ANUNCIOS.COM&amp;ad_type=text&amp;color_bg=EEEEEE&amp;color_border=EEEEEE
&amp;color_link=000066&amp;color_text=000000&amp;color_url=CC0000&amp;oe=utf8&amp;flash=14.0.0&amp;hl=es&a
mp;url=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%2Fvigilante%2Fexploits%2Fexploit2.php&amp;adsafe=high&amp;dt=1410420397140&a
mp;bpp=10&amp;bdt=23&amp;shv=r20140904&amp;cbv=r20140417&amp;saldr=sa&amp;correlator=8467094044672&amp;frm
=20&amp;ga_vid=482323067.1410420397&amp;ga_sid=1410420397&amp;ga_hid=2126412725&amp;ga_fc=0&amp;u_tz=120&a
mp;u_his=2&amp;u_java=1&amp;u_h=900&amp;u_w=1600&amp;u_ah=856&amp;u_aw=1600&amp;u_cd=24&amp;u_nplug=14&amp
;u_nmime=100&amp;dff=times%20new%20roman&amp;dfs=16&amp;adx=8&amp;ady=8&amp;biw=1600&amp;bih=795&amp;eid=3
17150304%2C317150313&amp;oid=3&amp;rx=0&amp;eae=0&amp;fc=8&amp;brdim=0%2C0%2C0%2C0%2C1600%2C0%2C1600%2C856
%2C1600%2C795&amp;vis=1&amp;abl=CS&amp;ppjl=u&amp;fu=0&amp;ifi=1&amp;xpc=EvP9CmkS4y&amp;p=http%3A//localho
st&amp;dtd=50" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" vspace="0" hspace="0" allowtransparency="true" 
scrolling="no" allowfullscreen="true"></iframe> 
 
Figure 2. Insertion of the show_ads.js iframes  
Iframe 1 contains a Google AdSense code cross-
checking and integrity verification method within the 
website being loaded (Linden, J.; Teeter, T. 2006). This 
system allocates the ad identifier and user necessary to 
execute the code inserted in Iframe 2, hampering the 
handling of the ad source code for automatic extraction. 
Furthermore, Iframe 2 loads a dynamic website 
containing the ads themselves.  
Thus, to make a valid loading of the ads in  
Iframe 2, permitted by Iframe 1, it is necessary to 
execute all the Google AdSense code and subsequently 
extract the link of the Iframe 2 dynamic website. To do 
so you can use XSS and JavaScript techniques. In 
particular a form called “technical1”, with a field storing 
the Iframe 2 URL address, is added to the 
“GoogleAdSense” layer. This is achieved through the 
instructions shown in figure 3.  
 
 
Method of replacing the target website source code. We can see that the GoogleAdSense layer is written again with 
the form “technical1” that will be used as data recipient.   
 
$html1 = preg_replace("/<div id=\"GoogleAdSense\">/", "<div id=\"GoogleAdSense\"> + Form technical1", 
$html1); 
 
 
Form “technical1”, introduced within the “GoogleAdSense” layer containing the “code1” text area, where the 
“Iframe2” URL address is to be stored once it is executed in the website.  
 
<div id="GoogleAdSense"> 
      <div> 
        <form name='technical1' action='$_SERVER[PHP_SELF]' method='post'> 
        <textarea id='code1' name='code1'></textarea> 
        </form> 
      </div> 
</div> 
 
 
JavaScript code to extract and copy the “Iframe2” URL address and to paste it in the “code1” text area of the 
“technical1” form. 
 
<script> 
window.onload = init; 
function init() { 
document.getElementById('code1').value=document.getElementById('google_ads_frame1').src; 
document.technical1.submit(); 
} 
</script> 
 
Figure 3. Code to extract the link of Iframe 2
Figure 3 script is executed once the website is loaded, 
like the AdSense code, but subsequently to allow Iframe 
1 and 2 to be loaded. Then a value will be assigned to 
the field of “code1” form corresponding to the Iframe 2 
URL address, identified as “google_ads_frame1”. Once 
obtained, “technical1” form will be transmitted with 
such information.In figure 2 it is noticeable that the 
Iframe 2 URL address is not correct, as it introduces 
among its variables the domain address from which the 
code is being executed: see URL 
“http://localhost/vigilante/exploits/exploit2.php”. By 
clicking on the ad without modifying these values of 
related pages, Google AdSense could detect some sort 
of incoherence. To avoid it Iframe 2 URL address shall 
be modified in the &url and &p variables, see figure 4. 
 
$code = $_POST[code1]; 
$code = preg_replace("/\&url=.*\&adsafe/", "&url=http://www.anuncios.com/&adsafe", $code); 
$code = preg_replace("/\&p=http.*/", "&p=http://www.anuncios.com", $code); 
Figure 4. Modification of the link of Iframe 2 
When the link of Iframe 2 is retrieved, the variables 
&url and &p will be replaced by the domain address of 
the studied website, in this case 
http://www.anuncios.com, through regular expressions. 
Once the URL address of Iframe 2 is prepared, the 
source code is retrieved, with the function 
“file_get_contents”, directly accessing to the links of the 
ads already validated by Google AdSense. During this 
process, you can use DOM to load the HTML structure 
of the page and XPath to obtain only the available links, 
see figure 5.
 
$html2 = file_get_contents("$code"); 
$dom2 = new DOMDocument(); 
@$dom2->loadHTML($html2); 
$xpath2 = new DOMXPath($dom2); 
$links = $xpath2->query("/html/body//a"); 
Figure 5. Obtaining the source code of the Iframe 2 page and retrieval of the links of the ads 
The result of applying this method is the links of the ads, as shown in figure 6. To test the functioning, this program can 
be downloaded at: http://www.mblazquez.es/docs/google-ads-extractor.zip. You can also see how it works at: 
https://youtu.be/0tIBcJ-VN7s  
 http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/aclk?sa=l&ai=CCWOcql4RVJDHLIHCiQa1zoCICa-
GqZsH75Pj9aIBwI23ARABIPmY_AEoA1DA6qP9-
v____8BYNW11wKgAdHQoN4DyAEBqQKMWfG0Fae1PqgDAcgDwwSqBG5P0Ig3k_RIM7eChCXVjUsXttfDLlj6od6JU7FeWhdmg0GwM8-
w6Nhuh9awpyuPhzyt-gKK2kLj6_Fp03lAl8FoHzX6xTk8nztGi79o9q9viXDkav02-Yi2F5OT67hR-
ItZO2J04gvpcTvvajkQpYAHl6_fIQ&num=1&sig=AOD64_2umGsoLzRoV9h4YazaUGzHORn0xQ&client=ca-pub-
1229649499684927&adurl=http://candidatos.sanroman.com/resultado-
busqueda.php%3Ffiltro%3D%26area%3DMarketing%26sector%3D0%26modalidad%3D0%26provincia%3DMADRID%26seccion%3D 
 
http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/aclk?sa=l&ai=Cj0h3ql4RVJDHLIHCiQa1zoCICfGSgIoF2Z2bkJcBwI23ARACIPmY_AEoA
1DwkovEBGDVtdcCoAH___T8A8gBAagDAcgDwwSqBG5P0NgMkPRLM7eChCXVjUsXttfDLlj6od6JU7FeWhdmg0GwM8-
w6Nhuh9awpyuPhzyt-gKK2kLj6_Fp03lAl8FoHzX6xTk8nztG1dsY_a9viXDkav02-Yi2F5OT67hR-ItZO2J04gvpcTvvEC0ehYAH6f-
KAw&num=2&sig=AOD64_2PS3pUS7ccIZ8gg9nxsoRo1dgCCg&client=ca-pub-
1229649499684927&adurl=http://es.emailbrain.com/ebs/index.shtml%3FMedium%3DPPC%26Campaign%3DES_Email_Marke
ting%26Adgroup%3DEmail_Marketing_-_Broad 
 
http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/aclk?sa=L&ai=C4_Hlql4RVJDHLIHCiQa1zoCICamd6N0E4def75EBwI23ARADIPmY_AEoA
1CJtf3UB2DVtdcCyAEBqQKMWfG0Fae1PqgDAcgDwwSqBGtP0Khal_RKM7eChCXVjUsXttfDLlj6od6JU7FeWhdmg0GwM8-
w6Nhuh9awpyuPhzyt-gKK2kLj6_Fp03lAl8FoHzX6xXE8Vwfifvy9qq9vw3DkOuA2-
n2112aQK0xS6H9aK9d34qvv2A9jrYAH2Zf5Lg&num=3&sig=AOD64_1aYwxLbhcZISbWwRtDQhgLRfddmg&client=ca-pub-
1229649499684927&adurl=http://www.banderasysoportes.com 
Figure 6. Links to ads obtained automatically 
The method of automatic extraction of links of AdSense 
ads can be summarized in the steps set forth below: a) 
extraction of the target website source code, b) detection 
of the Google AdSense Java code, c) Execution of the 
Google AdSense Java code, d) Iframe 1 and 2 loading, 
e) Insertion of the technical1 form and code1 field, f) 
Extraction of Iframe2 URL address to code1 field, g) 
Submission of the form to the same execution 
environment, h) Preparation of the URL of Iframe2 
transmitted in the form, i) Obtaining the URL address 
source code of iframe 2, j) Extraction of links of the ads. 
 
 
Figure 7. Summary of the automatic extraction process of links of AdSense ads  
 
2) Executing automatic clicks on the ads obtained   
After demonstrating the capacity to extract the links of 
the ads automatically, it doesn’t sound strange to click 
on the links of the ads obtained. Such task may be 
complex because Google AdSense has been putting in 
place statistical security measures able to detect 
fraudulent clicks. This filter system (Google Support. 
2014) is hypothetically capable to recognize the clicks 
whose objective is to increase the advertising expenses 
to raise the profits of the website owners hosting their 
ads. In such a case they are automatically disabled. 
According to (Adwords Blogspot. 2007) around 10% of 
the registered clicks are fraudulent and detected 
automatically by the system, in 0,02% of the cases a 
specialized research is necessary to determine their 
validity. Likewise it is also to be noted that it you can 
have false positives in the process, as stated by (Dave, 
V.; Guha, S.; Zhang, Y. 2012, p.178) in his paper about 
click-spam quantification in advertisement webs.   
Going further into the topic of fraudulent clicks 
detection, according to (Kshetri, N. 2010), the current 
security systems may be classified in: a) Anomalies 
detection, b) Heuristic detection of invalid clicks 
depending on several variables such as the proportion, 
clicks ratio, browsing path. c) Through a classification 
of users’ patterns of behavior and clicks. For Google 
AdSense, it is very likely that they incorporate a 
combination of such methods on the basis of published 
patents on the subject.   
For example, the identification method for 
advertisement processing (Li, Z.; Ou, C.; Park, S.U.; 
Savoor, R.; Sposato, S. 2007) designed to test the IP and 
the time spent by the user on the website where he clicks. 
If we are facing an automatic click, the time spent by the 
user would be close to zero or the clicking IP would be 
the same.  
It is also to mention the patent for the detection of 
fraudulent clicks of (Gillespie, J.; Meggs, A.F. 2007) 
which records each user click and the research and 
browsing path inputting information such as the clicks 
per minute rate, the click coverage ratio, the average 
number of visits and clicks on the website, the user visits 
and clicks ratio, among other items. This method 
assumes that a deviation above normal, with regard to 
the increase of the visits and clicks statistics in a website, 
involves the automatic detection of fictitious clicks. The 
weakness of this method lies in the possibility of 
disguising statistically the clicks, increasing the number 
of visits and controlling the time spent on the websites, 
before executing the automatic click. 
The patent for the detection of fraudulent clicks of 
(Zwicky, R.K. 2010) puts forward a stepped system that 
takes into account the advertiser for fraud detection, 
providing supervision panels to report suspicious 
situations, like for example IP addresses from visitors 
considered to be robots, sudden click increase and 
aberrations in the browsing of the user clicking. 
On the methods for fraudulent click detection through 
automatic classification, (Yan, J. H.; Jiang, W. R. 2014) 
patent is utterly essential. It is a system which registers 
with tabs the users accessing the target website, 
identifying their browsing and clicks on advertisements. 
Thanks to this method, when the patterns do not coincide 
with the ordinary use of the website, or with the usual 
number of visits, the user will be considered a robot and 
his clicks turn out to be fraudulent. This fact is registered 
and serves as experience for the detection of further 
malicious clicks.    
Whereas there are many security measures, their 
complete vulnerability appears to be a process difficult 
to determine without Google’s collaboration. Despite 
this fact, security problems may arise if the following 
premises were met: 
 
a) Websites group for user attraction. One way to 
avoid user IP addresses to be always the same is to use 
a Websites group with an uninterrupted and varied 
worldwide number of visits.  Each visit may be used to 
load in an iframe window the program necessary to 
extract the links of the ads of a target website and click 
on them. Therefore the time factor and the user IP 
address would be resolvable. Still, this method is not 
foolproof, because Google can notice that the number of 
visits of the target website which has the advertisements 
is not customary and thus register more clicks than the 
initially likely to occur. In that case it is possible to 
redirect visits without clicking on the ads, in order to 
increase the number of visits of the site and thereby the 
traffic, in a variable and progressive manner. If the 
traffic rises, the possibility to click on the website ads 
also grows proportionately.    
 
b) Program for the redirection, link extraction 
and automatic click. A JavaScript program can 
generate an invisible Iframe window on the websites 
aimed to attract users, this will allow to load at the same 
time the target website containing the ads to be clicked 
and will execute the link extraction method previously 
proposed to finally decide, depending on the statistics if 
you have to click or not on the advertisement link or if 
you have to wait. This system could violate the heuristic 
methods, patterns and automatic classification, while 
acquiring the normal users of the website own habits.   
These security problems become a violation strategy to 
make automatic clicks, see figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. Automatic click strategy  
The users accessing from several IP addresses, visit 
websites which “seize” their user session through the 
execution of a Java code loading an invisible Iframe, in 
the page they are visiting. However, in the invisible 
iframe the target website with the ads is loaded and the 
automatic ad links extraction program is executed at the 
same time. Once stored, the program can be designed to 
take several decisions, for example; a) Wait for a 
random or statistically defined period, b) Visit another 
page of the website to simulate another query from the 
user, c) Not to click depending on the website ratio, d) 
Click on an ad. The vulnerability is executed as many 
times the user accesses to the capturing websites, 
obtaining for each of them different advertisements, 
customized for each profile, as Google AdSense would 
do it without vulnerability. 
 
To test the automatic click strategy hypothesis, a 
program which simulates a user capturing blog, called 
“blog1” and a target blog which contains ads, called 
“blog2” has been developed.  Blog1 executes a 
“google_analytics_top.js” java code allowing the 
introduction within the layer with “booster” identifier of 
two other layers called “sub1” and “sub2” as well as a 
new iframe containing the code for the extraction of the 
links of the ads in blog2 and the loading process of the 
later, using programmed rules and patterns simulating a 
normal behavior of the user. Once you click on the 
advertisement, the program erases any trace removing 
any reference to the link contained in the layer. This 
program can be downloaded at: 
http://www.mblazquez.es/docs/booster.zip.  
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Google AdSense dazzles the ad codes, hindering the 
access to his links, to avoid them to be used for 
malicious purposes. To that end they avoid viewing their 
source code through the two embedded iframes and 
generated with java. This way, the specialized robots 
cannot retrieve automatically the links of the ads.  
However, the security of the published ads in the 
websites associated to the Google Adsense program is 
potentially compromised because it is possible to 
retrieve automatically his links with the Google 
validation code, as it has been proven. This technique 
may be used to raise the profits in the pay per click 
system or to disable the ad publishing platform accounts 
from the competitors if the statistical limits are 
surpassed.    
 
Google AdSense does not protect so well the links of the 
ads as the detection systems afterwards. This means that 
the fictitious and true clicks must be filtered later. In fact 
Google uses up to 5 patents specialized in the statistical 
detection of fraudulent clicks.  
 
Taking into account that the detection systems by 
fraudulent click are based in the normal browsing 
patterns and user interaction, they could be overcomed 
applying a user capturing and re-direction method, 
combined with the advertisement automatic extraction. 
It is possible to simulate the user browsing in a website 
and click in a simple or coordinated way with the wished 
statistics.   
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